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In recent years the traditional collegial model of university management has been 
challenged by the rapid growth of higher education, a renewed emphasis on competition, and an 
increase in external demands for accountability, especially with regard to funding, quality control 
and research assessment. This transformation has been applauded by some because it is widely 
believed that the movement to hierarchical control and the rise of the academic manager would 
contribute to a reduction in agency costs and the costs of moral hazard occuring in the form of 
opportunism by those who simulate commitment to the moral values of the university community 
and to the patronage of intellectual elites associated with the collegial model (Valsan and Sproule 
2010). However, if the source of the agency problem in university management is not the 
collegial model but the poorly defined nature of the residual value produced by the university, the 
replacement of collegial management models with hierarchical models will not reduce agency 
costs and eliminate moral hazard. 
In any organization, collective action requires collaboration, and collaboration requires an 
economic surplus or residual value. Management is the mechanism framing collective action as a 
positive-sum game and establishing the norms used to determine how that surplus will be 
distributed amoung the stakeholders under conditions of uncertainty. The production of private 
goods permits the internalization of the economic surplus and the private distribution of residuals. 
In these circumstances, the use of a hierarchical management model which provides 
administrative rules and clear operating standards may be appropriate.  Universities and other 
public institutions which create public goods cannot internalize the economic surplus and have no 
residuals to distribute privately. The collaboration on which university collective action is based 
would not be possible without the collegial participation of academics. In this context, agency 
problems follow.  
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This paper begins with a discussion of agency and the issue of asymmetic information in 
Section 2. The question of agency in university management and a discussion of collegial and 
hierarchical management models are discussed in Section 3.  
Section 4 presents a discussion of the agency problems revealed in Section 2.4 of the 
report of the Comité international d’experts on the future of the Universite du Quebec a Trois 
Rivieres, (UQTR), REPENSER, RECENTRER, RELANCER. L’UQTR DE LA PROCHAINE 
DÉCENNIE. Two types of agency problems are identified in the conflict at UQTR, between (i) 
the fundamantal characteristic of the university to be open to the free market of ideas, and  (ii)  
the tendancy of local special interests to expropriate the university and use it for personal 
objectives not always corresponding with the long-term wellbeing of the university. The 
combined negative effects of the asymmetric market power of the university administration and 
the structural weakness of the corps professoral, due to academic, administrative and union-
administration forms of inbreeding on collegial management, are discussed.  
Decisions are made informally, which are then formally accepted and validated by the rank 
and file professor in section, COEX, staff meetings, and finally by the university administration 
under the sponsorship of senior professors, exercise of academic freedom, etc.  Agency problems 
are exacerbated.  There in no due process.  Private settling of accounts and harassment among 
individuals can be transformed into university policy. No attempts are made by the university 
administration to verify the validity of the claim against the targeted professor, who must file a 
harassment grievance that the union may not want to defend. Harassment is transformed into 
systematic harassment  by the university under the cover of an exercise of the right to manage 
This creates a formidable weapon for the members of the departemental clique to settle private 
conflicts because the legal costs of the conflict are paid by the university. It may also stimulate 
the supply of harassment grievance by encouraging further acts of harassment. 
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Certain forms of mobbing decision-making are based on a concept similar to a Type II error, 
in which a hypothesis that should be accepted is rejected, and in which people make judgements 
that complaints of harassment should be taken seriously. 
The grievance resolution process at UQTR is discussed in Section 5. If the union refuses to 
take the grievance to arbitrage, the professor may file a complaint with the Commission des 
relations du travail du Quebec, as discussed in Section 6.  
 
2. AGENCY AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION  
 The existence of agency problems and asymmetic information (moral hazard and adverse 
selection) in the private sector has been the subject of a longstanding discussion in the economic 
literature (Alchian and Allen 1964, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Becker 1997, Barzel 1997, Ang et 
al. 2000, Farrell 2001, Farrell 2003, Farrell 2006). Much of the analysis revolves around the 
analysis of contractual relationships (Menard 2000), with respect to publically held corporations 
and the incorporation of cultural values into the governance system of the firm (Ruys et al 2000). 
An agent is one who acts for another (Farrell 2009). Most agents respond to incentives 
and their consequences in much the same way as other individuals. Agency problems arising 
when agent incentives diverge from those of the client can best be analysed by examining the 
logic of the incentives that are created, their causes and effects, rather than examining just the 
goals being sought. 
In a perfect world, agent incentives would be congruent with the self-interest of the client, 
and the agent would work in solidarity with the client.  Agent-client incentives and objective 
would converge and agency problems would not arise. Agents would have the incentive to act 
altruistically, as a matter of principle and practice, and the wellbeing of the client would be 
identical with that of the agent. 
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In an imperfect world, the interests of the client and the agent’s incentive structure do not 
necessarily coincide. Agency problems arise when agent incentives diverge from those of the 
client and, due to asymmetic information whereby the agent has more information than the client, 
the agent is able to substitute his objectives for those of the client.  There are two main types of 
asymmetric information: (i) moral hazard and (ii) adverse selection.   
Moral hazard refers to situations in which the client’s out come depends on the actions of 
the agent, but the agent’s actions cannot be observed by the client. Only indirect or imperfect 
information is available. This creates a moral hazard that the agent will not act in solidarity with 
his client. The right to audit and court-enforced contracts mitigate the negative effects of 
imperfect information. Adverse selection occurs when one side in a transaction has better 
information about some relevant aspect of the transaction than the other side   
In the private sector, agency risk may be reduced or eliminated by competition between 
managers in managerial labor markets (Fama 1980). When the owner of an economic enterprise 
is also the manager, the self-interest of the owner and the self-interest of the manager coincide. 
When owners and managers are different people, agent incentives may diverge from those of the 
client. An agent, if left unmonitored, may pursue his own own personal risk-return preferences to 
the detriment of the client.  
As the size of the firm increases, the two functions usually attributed to the agent, 
management and risk-bearing, may be treated as naturally separate factors of production within a 
set of contracts known as “the firm.” Although individual stakeholders act from self-interest, they 
realize that their own individual destinies depend, to some extent, on the success of the 
management team of the firm in competition with the management teams of other firms. As the 
number of stakeholders increases, potential agency incentive problems associated with the 
5
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separation of ownership and control tend to be resolved by the discipline exerted on managers by 
managerial labor markets both within and outside the firm. 
As in the private sector, incentives are more important in public sector decision-making 
than objectives or good intentions in the structuring of successful public policy (Chubb and Moe 
1990, Migue 1999, Kelly-Gagnon 2000, Sowell 2003). The interest of the state in promoting 
social measures has led to the creation of government agencies (Braen 2003) which are often 
promoted as collective moral entreprises nominally based on a set of core social values or 
operating principles such as equity, fairness and solidarity. Historically, such agencies have fallen 
within the scope of social policy, not business ventures, and were financed by the taxpayer 
(Romanow 2002), (Courchene 2003).  
3. AGENCY IN UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT: COLLEGIAL vs HIERARCHICAL 
MODELS 
Universities are economic organizations, which provide a unique mix of public and 
private goods (Valsan and Sproule 2010).  Public goods have two characteristics: (i) non-
rivalrous consumption, whereby the consumption of that good or service by one consumer need 
not diminish the amount available for other consumers, and (ii) non-excludability, whereby once 
a good or service is produced, the cost of prohibiting non-payers from consuming the item is 
prohibitively costly. Non-excludability creates an incentive for a consumer to become a free-
rider, one who receives the benefits of a good or service without cost.  
 Public goods can be classified according to their degree of confinement, which describes 
the extent to which the benefits conferred by the public good can be internalized by the group 
incurring the cost of their production (Valsan and Sproule 2010).  The production costs of highly 
confined public goods tend to be completely internalized. To people outside the internalized 
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benefit area, the confined public good may be considered to be a private good. Unconfined public 
goods are public goods for which the costs are internalized but the benefits are not.   
Six theoretical schools of educational management are identified in the literature: formal, 
collegial, political, subjective, ambiguity, and cultural (Bush 2003). Each is based on a set of 
common assumptions: that decisions are made through a rational process; the authority of leaders 
is based on their position within the organization; and managers are accountable to national or 
state departments of education. Together these comprise a set of formal managerial models: (i) 
structural models, (ii) systems models, (iii) bureaucratic models, (iv) rational models, and (v) 
hierarchical models. 
  Hierarchical top-down management approaches stress vertical relationships within 
organizations and the accountability of leaders to external sponsors (Bush 2003). Information is 
passed down the structure, and subordinates are expected to implement the decisions made by 
senior management. Accountability is central to hierarchical models. Leaders are responsible to 
external agencies for the performance of subordinates and the performance of the organization 
(Bush 2003). This approach is based on the assumption that economic activity produces an 
economic surplus or residual value, and that ownership of the productive asset can be separated 
from the management of that asset. The provision of private goods allows for the internalization 
of residuals (Valsan and Sproule 2010).  In the case of the university a residual value is produced, 
but it cannot be separated from the ownership of the asset which produces that value, namely the 
individual owners of human capital, the faculty.  
Collegial management models in British education originated in the colleges of Oxford 
and Cambridge (Bush 2003).  
Collegium designates a structure or structures in which members have equal 
authority to participate in decisions, which are binding on each of them. It usually 
7
Farrell: Collegiality, Agency and Grievance Resolution: L'Universite du Qu
Published by The Keep, 2011
 8 
implies that individuals have discretion to perform their main operastions in their 
own way; subject only to minimal controls (Bush 2003). 
 
These models assume that service providers require a measure of autonomy and 
collaboration with other service providers to ensure a coherent approach to the supply 
management process. Professional service providers have a right and responsibility to participate 
in the decision-making process. Collegial models assume that members of the organization share 
a common set of values guiding the managerial process and possibly leading to shared 
professional objectives. The size of the decision-making group is a critical element in collegial 
management models. The scale problem can be dealt with by building in the assumption that 
members have formal representation within the various decision-making bodies. Significant areas 
of policy are determined within the official committee system rather than being a prerogative of 
individual leaders. The democratic element of formal representation rests on the allegiance owed 
by the elected delegates to their constituencies. The elected representative of each unit is 
responsible to unit members and can be replaced if the colleagues are not satisfied with the way 
they are being represented (Bush 2003).   
The essence of collegiality is participation in the decision-making process. Informal 
consultations do not constitute collegiality. Decisions are reached by consensus rather than by 
division or conflict (Bush 2003). The ethical dimension of collegial decision-making process is 
based in part on the assumption that it is appropriate to involve people in decisions, which affect 
their professional lives. The imposition of decisions is considered morally objectionable and 
inconsistent with the notion of consent (Bush 2003). 
Most “bottom heavy” university institutions of scholarship and research have adopted the 
collegial managerial model. This reflects the wide distribution of knowledge and competence 
within these institutions.  A wide range of academic and resource allocation issues is managed, 
8
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not by a vice-chancellor, but by an extensive committee system. College members make their 
own collective decisions, which have an authority legitimized by consensus, or at least 
compromise, amongst those to whom they apply (Bush 2003). The academic community is 
essentially a self-monitored, moral community, regulated by a series of implicit moral contracts. 
This may give rise to a number of agency costs in the form of the opportunism of those who 
simulate commitment to the moral values of the university community and to the patronage of 
intellectual elites (Valsan and Sproule 2010).   
In the 1990s, the collegial model of university management was eroded by the rapid 
growth of higher education and the increased emphasis on competition. In the newer universities, 
the collegial model has been challenged by the movement to hierarchical control and the rise of 
the academic manager. Attempts to maintain collegiality are increasingly challenged by external 
demands for accountability, especially with regard to funding, quality control and research 
assessment. 
It is not clear that the replacement of collegial management models with hierarchical 
models will reduce agency costs and eliminate moral hazard in the management of the university. 
The source of the problem is not collegial management but the poorly defined nature of the 
residual value produced by the university (Valsan and Sproule 2010). In any organization, 
collective action requires collaboration, and collaboration requires an economic surplus or 
residual value. Management is the mechanism framing collective action as a positive-sum game 
and establishing the norms used to determine how that surplus will be distributed amoung the 
stakeholders under conditions of uncertainty. The production of private goods permits the 
internalization of the economic surplus and the private distribution of residuals. A hierarchical 
model which provides administrative rules and clear operating standards may be appropriate. 
Universities and other public institutions which create public goods cannot internalize the 
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economic surplus and have no residuals to distribute privately. The collaboration on which 
university collective action is based would not be possible without the collegial participation of 
academics. 
4. AGENCY AND COLLEGIAL MANAGEMENT AT L’UNIVERSITE DU QUEBEC A 
TROIS RIVIERES  
L’Universite du Quebec a Trois Rivieres (UQTR) was founded on March 19, 1969, as one 
of seven constituent members of the Universite du Quebec (UQ) state university system. Trois 
Rivieres is the regional capital of La Mauricie, one of the poorest regions in Quebec and Canada; 
structural unemployment is higher than the national average and mobility rates are low. The 
university is a major employer in the region and was initially located in Trois Rivieres in part to 
provide a pole of economic development, a source of stable employment in the academic, 
administrative and service sectors of the region. The university management team is composed of 
one recteur and four vice-recteurs as indicated in the most recent organigramme (Figure 1). 
University employees other than senior administrators are classified in four different unionized 
groups: professors, professionals, support staff and maintenence. Total enrollment in both 
undergraduate (85 per cent)  and graduate (15 per cent) programs is approximately 10,000 
students, most of whom come from the province of Quebec. There are approximately 50,000 
alumni in Quebec and foreign countries, primarily francophone countries in Africa.  
The professor’s union, Le Syndicat des professeurs et professeures de l’Universite du 
Quebec a Trois Rivieres (SPPUQTR), is managed by the union executive, elected from the 350 
member corps professoral; the executive donates their time without formal remuneration (the 
president receives some course relief). There are two full-time union employees: an executive 
vice president (conseiller technique) and a secretary, in addition to a lawyer who works part-time 
on a time-sharing basis with various other unions.  
10
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In the UQ system the modus operandi describing the mechanics of the collegial 
management structure are defined in the convention collective (union agreement). Subject to the 
Code du Travail and the Code Civil du Quebec, the convention collective defines the set of 
agency relationships which exist between the union, the corps professoral and the university 
administration (Figure 2). The university’s annual operating budget of $100 million dwarfs the 
union’s annual operating budget of $350,000 and gives the university administration an 
asymmetrical market power viv-a vis the union. In grievance arbitrage hearings, even though 
the university has four or five lawyers in-house,  it is not unusual for the university to hire outside 
lawyers, at $350 per hour plus expenses, to oppose the part-time union lawyer. The union does 
not have the money to file a grievance each time the university administration violates the union 
agreement. In cases where the union is faced with two union members, the plaintiff and 
professor-members of the university management team, the union is reluctant to go to arbitrage. 
This is especially true when the union is continually under pressure from union members who are 
also members of the harassment cliques, as well as self-interested professors who are union 
members and university administrators, to abandon the targeted professor and save union money. 
The asymmetric market power of the university administration is consolidated and 
perpetuated by the structural weakness of the corps professoral which arise due to academic, 
administrative, and union-administration forms of inbreeding.    
Academic inbreeding at UQTR.  Since it was founded in 1969, L ‘UQTR has experienced 
significant ongoing difficulties in attracting and retaining qualified professors and researchers. 
Over the 1969 to 1989 time period, many professors were hired at UQTR who lacked a research 
profile. Most would not have been hired at other institutions of higher learning (Type I hiring 
error). The union agreement was crafted to reflect these realities. The evaluation of the four 
components of the professor job description: (i) teaching, (ii) research, (iii) community service, 
11
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and (iv) academic administration was modified to emphasize teaching evaluations, the production 
of course notes, which qualified as research, plus a lot of public service and university 
administration. Many Type I professors were hired, received tenure and were promoted to full 
professor. Some moved to senior administrative positions, including dean, vice-recteur and 
recteur. The set of agency relationships which exist between the union, the corps professoral, 
Type I and non-Type I professors, and the university administration can be  presented graphically 
(Figure 3). The various agency conflicts between the nine subgroupings – G1 to G9 of the three 
basic groups which interact to operate the university: (i) professors, (ii) the union and (iii) the 
university administration (Figure 3). The professor group is divided into two subgroups: Type 1 
hirers (T1), and non-Type 1 hirers (nT1). At the Universite du Quebec a Trois Rivieres there are 
two types of professors: (i) les professeurs en dedans, professors holding research Ph.D.s who 
conduct research and publish the results in international scientic journals, and  (ii) professors en 
dehors, who do not have a  Ph.D. and do not publish their work. A modele de Gestion du Beigne 
has been created in which the authentic university professors are found at the departmental level 
and the non-Ph.D.s assume upper level management positions 
 The 1990 to 2005 interval was a period of financial compression at UQTR. It was 
difficult to recruit new faculty in many disciplines. To fill positions, many departments created a 
new kind of professor who did little research. A form of academic inbreeding was introduced 
whereby they hired their own junior college professors. This affected collegiality by undermining 
the moral ethical aspect of the independent researcher. It shifted the focus of the collegial 
decision-making process from an expression of the academic freedom of the individual professor 
to a forum dominated by the special interest power cliques formed to protect the new class of 
professor.  
12
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One effect of academic inbreeding is that the corps professoral at UQTR is quite 
heterogeneous. Marginalized professors become disinterested and disconnected and, in acts of 
mobbing and harassment, some professors were targeted for non-compliance. Non-tenured 
professors, fearful for their jobs, participated and even led attacks on the targeted professor 
victims. Permanent professors seeking to move up through the administrative as opposed to the 
research ranks also participated in the targeting of colleagues.  
Administrative inbreeding at UQTR. At any given time approximately 20 to 25 per cent 
of the corps professoral-union members are simultaneously paid members of the university 
management team. Department directors, section heads, program directors, directors of research 
centers and other administrators are simultaneously voting union members and voting members 
of the Assemble departementale. This may give rise to conflicts of interest. Grievances filed 
against a given administrative decision, made by a given administrator, may be the subject of a 
complaint to the union by that same administrator acting as a union member. 
According to Art. 23.07 of the union agreement, a professor who accepts an 
administrative position at the University (recteur, vice recteur, doyen, etc.) is granted a conge 
d’affectation, whereby he/she retains all of the rights of a professor of the university and may 
return to his former position and continue to receive the administrative salary received as cadre 
superieur de l’universite. In the summer of 2009, three of the four vice-recteurs/rectrices were 
professors en conge d’affectation and one was a former vice-president of the union.  
The academic and administrative inbreeding at UQTR has created a conflict of 
interest for the union due to the various conflicting positions taken by various members in their 
roles as administrator, professor, union member, undermining its ability to protect the rights of its 
members. In some cases, vice-recteurs have refused to appear as witnesses in grievance hearings; 
the union, possibly in response to pressure from various members, was unwilling to issue 
13
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subpoenas. In another case, a vice-recteur was found to have committed perjury in testimony in a 
grievance hearing, but the union refused to pursue the case. Later the vice-recteur, a lawyer as 
opposed to an academic, was promoted to general secretary of the head office of the University of 
Quebec.  
One vice-recteur, when called to testify, refused to appear, claiming that he was not in the 
habit of testifying at grievances where his behavior was called into question. In some cases it 
appears that the union, when pressured by other union members or unwilling to engage in a 
finmancial conflict with the university administration, is likewise unwilling to protect member 
rights under Articles 81.18 et 81.19 (harassment), and allows alleged acts of harassment 
committed by management to be treated as managerial questions (exercise of the right of 
management). 
The university administration has used its asymmetric market power to impose working 
conditions in the union agreement which are not favorable to the professors on key issues such as 
hiring, tenure and promotion. Toward the end of the 1990’s, the professor’s pension plan was in 
surplus, but, due in part to reduced enrollment, the university was experiencing financial 
difficulty. The professor’s union agreed to temporarily suspend wage increases and grant a 
pension plan contribution holiday to the university to help re-establish financial equilibrium. The 
university agreed to recapture the delayed wage increases after its financial position improved.  
However, when the financial position improved the university administration ignored its 
committments to the professors and, under a new rector, embarked on a series of new 
expenditures: the construction of a new health studies building; an increase in the number of 
senior level administrative positions, including the hiring of a new vice-recteur position; and an 
enhanced team of lawyers in anticipation of an enhanced series of union grievances.  
14
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In January 2008, after the university refused to negotiate, the professors union went on 
strike. At UQTR professor pay is based on a seven-day week. From January to April 2008, 
professors were on strike from Monday to Friday and locked out by the university on Saturday 
and Sunday. Initially, the university refused to negotiate with the union over wage parity with the 
other constituents of the UQ system. The university rector claimed that that UQTR professors 
were less productive than those at other UQ campuses and did not merit wage parity. 
For strikers, fear of lost employment over the summer of 2008 was compounded by a 
significant number of dual-function professors, who, while union members, simultaneously held 
compensated managerial positions, or were discipline and department heads, etc. Many dual-
function union members and Type I professors took management’s part and attacked the union, 
encouraging their colleagues to vote against the strike and, after the strike began, to vote to end 
the strike prematurely. 
Lost in the struggle, there was little opportunity to negotiate the significant issues of 
tenure, promotion, sabbaticals, pension rights and the ownership of intellectual property rights. 
These issues are a major source of conflict within the professoral corps which, especially after the 
enactment of the anti-harassment law in 2004, have given rise to an increasing number of 
expensive harassment grievances involvings senior managers (vice-rector, rector) of the 
university. The new union agreement was signed on November 5, 2008. 
The combined effects of the asymmetric market power of the university 
administration and the structural weakness of the corps professoral and by extension, the 
union, arising due to academic, administrative and union-administration forms of inbreeding 
were identified in Section 2.4 of the report of the Comité international d’experts on the future of 
UQTR, REPENSER, RECENTRER, RELANCER. L’UQTR DE LA PROCHAINE 
DÉCENNIE.  
15
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The report states that for a long time UQTR has been torn apart by a fundamental conflict 
between (i) the fundamantal characteristic of the university to be open to the free market of 
ideas, and, on the other hand, (ii) the tendancy of local special interests to expropriate the 
university and use it for their own personal interests, which do not always correspond with the 
long-term wellbeing of the university. In effect, the effective control of the decision-making 
bodies of the department, section assemble departementale and the university administration are 
controlled by the ruling clique; few non-clique members are involved, or become disinterested, 
and do not participate in departmental activities. 
 Examples of special treatment include the promotion process and multiple employment.   
The union agreement does not require transparence in the promotion process.  In many cases, 
unqualified local professors are promoted, promotion d’ami, and qualified non-local professors 
are repeatedly denied promotion and have no recourse under the union agreement. In one case, a 
local professor who was Type I and held an administrative position in the department, was also a 
union delegate and worked full-time as a lawyer outside the university. Although this was 
prohibited under the union agreement, nothing was done. Futher, this person led a 
harassment/mobbing process against a colleague. In other cases, grievances against 
administrators who are also connected union members of long seniority may not be acted upon. 
The expropriation of the collegial management model by local special interests has 
increased administration costs by encouraging harassment and mobbing in the workplace.  It can 
be used to transform incidents of personal conflicts of interest or a settling of accounts, and acts 
of non-systematic harassment may be transformed into acts of systematic harassment by the 
university administration. Likewise, it may encourage the formation of harassment cliques, where 
various methods, including the informal spreading of negative information of which the target is 
16
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unaware, are used to discredit the target. If there are insufficient formal criteria available, it can 
be fabricated and/or informal methods can be used. 
Decisions are  made informally, which are then formally accepted and validated by the rank 
and file professor in section, COEX, staff meetings and finally by the university administration, 
under the sponsorship of senior professors, exercise of academic freedom, etc.  No attempt to 
verify the validity of the claim against the professor, who must file a harassment grievance that 
the union may not want to defend, transforms harassment into systematic harassment  by the 
university under cover as an exercise of the right to manage; like a type of money laundering, this 
becomes official policy of the university and goes unquestioned by the vice-recteur and recteur. 
Certain forms of mobbing decision-making is based on a concept similar to a Type II error, in 
which a hypothesis that should be accepted is rejected, and in which people make judgements that 
complaints of harassment should be taken seriously. 
The net effect is that, due to the management and human resource management policies of the 
university, the private settling of accounts and harassment amoung individuals is transformed into 
a university policy of systematic institutionalized harassment. The university then attempts to 
justify its harassing actions as the right to manage (la droit de direction universitaire), as 
permitted by the union agreement. This creates a formidable weapon for the members of the 
departemental clique to settle private conflicts, because the legal costs of the conflict are paid by 
the university. It may also stimulate the supply of harassment grievance by encouraging further 
acts of harassment. 
This is very expensive for the university and the union. L ‘Universite du Quebec a Trois 
Rivieres is a milk cow for the outside lawyers. The base rate is $350/hr plus costs, expenses, etc. 
In one case, the university paid more than $500,000 to one professor, while total costs exceeded 
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$1,000,000 for the university. This is not important to the harassers because they don’t pay. It’s 
not their money; it is taxpayer money. 
The professor-harassment target is marginalized, an untouchable whom no one wants to work 
with for fear of becoming contaminated or becoming a new target of harassment. Until the 
harassment grievance is resolved, the targeted professor lives a life of stress and fear, potentially 
destroying the university career. 
5. GRIEVANCE RESOLUTION: L’UNIVERSITE DU QUEBEC A TROIS RIVIERES 
The grievance resolution process is defined in Article 24 of the union agreement (Figure 
2). All grievances must be resolved according to the terms of Article 24 (Art. 24.02). 
A grievance is a dispute which arises from a perceived violation, incorrect interpretation 
or application by one or more partys to the union agreement between the University on the one 
hand and the union or a professor on the other (Art. 24.03). Such disputes often involve (i) the 
hiring of professors (Art. 9), (ii) working conditions (Art. 10), (iii) professor evaluation (Art. 11), 
(iv) tenure (Art. 12), (v) sabbatical leave (Art. 14), (vi) termination (Art. 18), and (vii) 
promotions (Art. 22). 
The specifications lay out the series of procedural steps (Art. 24.05), 60-day filing date 
(Art. 24.06), meeting of the grievance committee (Art. 24.07), composition of the committee with 
both the union and the university naming two representatives, and number of meetings of the 
grievance committee. Both sides have ten days to resolve the grievance (Art. 24.08). If the 
grievance is resolved, an agreement is signed by both parties (Art. 24.09).  
If the grievance is not resolved, either the union or the university may demand arbitrage, 
(Art. 24.10). The union must file the demand for arbitrage with the vice-recteur aux ressources 
humaines (VRRH) (Art 24. 11), within 25 days of the expiration of the ten-day resolution period 
specified in Article 24.08. 
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If the union refuses to demand arbitrage, a professor may file a complaint with La 
Commission des relations du travail du Quebec (CRT), under articles 47.2 and 47.3 du Code du 
travail du Quebec (failure to represent). A hearing of the complaint will be held by 
commissionaire de la CRT. If the Commissionaire accepts the complaint and grants the professor 
the right to be represented by a lawyer of his/her choice, the grievance will be heard as in the case 
when the union takes the grievance to arbitrage.      
The arbitre selection and the competence and area of jurisdiction of the arbitre are defined 
in Article 24.11. The arbitre must render judgement based on the articles of the union agreement, 
which cannot be modified in any way. When a grievance involves a monetary claim, the union 
may request that the arbitre first decide if a sum of money is payable without a determination of 
the amount. If the grievance is accepted by the arbitre and the two sides can not decide on the 
amount, then the issue may be submitted to the same arbitre for a decision on the amount 
payable. The arbitre has the competence to support, cancel or mitigate any disciplinary measure 
imposed by the University.    
If possible, the arbitre should render a decision within 30 days of the end of the hearing. 
However, the decision is still valid if not rendered within the 30-day time limit (Art. 24.13). The 
arbitre’s decision is final, can not be appealed and must be carried out as soon as possible. If one 
party decides to appeal the decision to a higher jurisdiction, the sentence of the labour tribunal 
remains in effect until the appeal is decided (Art. 24.13). In a case of termination, the professor 
may skip the preliminary stages and proceed directly to arbitrage (Art 24.14). Both parties pay 
their own legal costs and half of the honorariums paid to the arbitre. Unless there is mutual 
agreement, neither party is required to pay for stenographic services (Art 24.15). All professors 
called as witnesses are paid as per usual (Art 24.16). A technical error in the written grievance 
submission does not render the grievance invalid (Art 24.17).     
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6. FILING A COMPLAINT WITH THE COMMISSION DES RELATIONS DU 
TRAVAIL 
Unions may refuse to take a harassment grievance to arbitrage. In this case the union member 
has 60 days to file a complaint with the Commission des relations du travail. To initiate the 
complaint process against the union with the Commission des relations du travail, under Articles 
47.2 and 47.3 (Failure to Represent), the plaintiff must file Form 10210-01(05) with the 
Commission within the 60-day filing period. The form consists of six sections.  
Section I identifies the plaintiff, the union and the employer. Representatives of all three 
participants attend the hearing. 
Section II describes the alleged failure of the union to represent the member, including the 
date the failure occurred and the date the member became aware of the union failure. 
Section III describes the disciplinary measure(s) imposed by the employer on the member and 
the date imposed. 
Section IV contains a detailed description of the facts which motivate the complaint, 
including a chronology of events, locations, names of persons involved, names of witnesses, etc. 
Section V describes the remedies sought by the union member from the Commission des 
relations du travail: 
FIND IN FAVOR of the complaint 
 
  
AUTHORIZE the professor to initiate/continue the arbitrage already in progress at the expense 
of the Syndicat des Professeurs et Professeurs de l’Universite du Quebec a Trois Rivieres, 
(SPPUQTR), and receive a decision according to the union agreement; 
  
AUTHORIZE the professor to hire his own lawyer and pursue the arbitrage with expenses paid 
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ORDER the Syndicat des Professeurs et Professeures de l’Universite du Quebec a Trois 
Rivieres, (SPPUQTR), to pay the professor, on presentation of a statement of expenses and the 
necessary receipts, the costs incurred to execute the present decision. 
 
ORDER the Syndicat des Professeurs et Professeures de l’Universite du Quebec a Trois Rivieres, 
(SPPUQTR), to put in place a set of transparent policies and practices to assure that LA POLITIQUE 
SUR L’HARCELEMENT PSYCHOLOGIQUE AU TRAVAIL DE L’UQTR, (2004 – CA489-09-
R4818) is applied to all employees of the University, including senior management, to resolve 
HARASSMENT-RIGHT TO MANAGE conflicts which arise between professors and senior 
management of the university. 
  
ORDER l'Université du Quebec a Trois Rivieres, to put in place a set of transparent policies and 
practices to assure that LA POLITIQUE SUR L’HARCELEMENT PSYCHOLOGIQUE AU 
TRAVAIL DE L’UQTR, (2004 – CA489-09-R4818) is applied to all employees of the University, 
including senior management, to resolve HARASSMENT-RIGHT TO MANAGE conflicts which arise 
between professors and senior management of the university. 
 
RENDER all other orders necessary to protect the interests of the professor concerned with regard to 
the application of the measures described in the union agreement. 
 
RESERVE jurisdiction to resolve any problems which arise from the present order. 
 
  Section VI contains the signature of the union member and date.  
 
 A copy of the complaint is sent to the Commission des relations du travail, the union  
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Group 1: employees who have both union and management representation 
Group 2: employees who have both union and management representation 
Group 3: employees who have both union and management representation 
Group 4: employees who have both union and management representation 
Group 5: employees who have both union and management representation 
Group 6: employees who have management representation 
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FIGURE 3. COLLEGIAL MANAGEMENT MODEL WITH TYPE I TENURE 
 
 













































Group 1:  union representives who are also members of management 
Group 2: T 1  employees who have both union and management representatives 
Group 3:T1   employees who have both union and management representatives 
Group 4: T 1  employees who have union and management representatives 
Group 5: T1   employees who have also members of management 
Group 6: T 1    employees 
Group 7: T1  employees 
Group 8:  union representatives 
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FIGURE 5. PLAINTE À L’ENCONTRE D’UNE ASSOCIATION DE SALARIÉS 
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APPENDIX 1. Article 24 – Procédures de règlements des griefs 
 
24.01 Il est de l'intention des parties d'en arriver à une solution équitable de tout conflit qui 
survient entre elles, et ce, dans les plus brefs délais. 
24.02 Tout grief est régi conformément aux dispositions du présent article. 
24.03 Le mot grief signifie un litige découlant d'une prétendue violation ou mauvaise 
interprétation ou application d'une partie ou du tout de la présente convention entre 
l'Université d'une part, le Syndicat ou le professeur d'autre part. 
24.04 Chacune des étapes de la procédure de règlement des griefs décrites dans les articles 
ci-dessous doit être épuisée avant de passer à la suivante, à moins d'un consentement écrit 
des parties, ou de dispositions contraires. 
24.05 Le professeur, seul ou par l'intermédiaire du représentant du Syndicat, ou le Syndicat 
soumet le grief dûment signé au Vice-recteur aux ressources humaines dans les soixante (60) 
jours civils qui suivent la connaissance de l'événement qui a donné lieu au grief, mais 
n'excédant pas un délai de six (6) mois de l'occurrence du fait. Chacun de ces délais est de 
rigueur. 
24.06 Suite à la réception du grief, le Vice-recteur aux ressources humaines fait droit au grief 
ou convoque le comité des griefs dans les deux (2) jours ouvrables. Le comité doit se réunir 
dans les huit (8) jours ouvrables suivant la convocation du Vice-recteur. 
24.07 Le Comité des griefs est composé de deux (2) représentants du Syndicat et de deux (2) 
représentants de l'Université. Il établit lui-même ses règles de procédure interne. 
Chaque partie, dans les trente (30) jours suivant la signature de la présente convention, 
désigne son porte-parole officiel au comité des griefs et en informe l'autre. 
Il ne peut pas y avoir plus d'une réunion du comité concernant un grief à moins du 
consentement mutuel des parties et dans ce cas le grief est reporté à une prochaine réunion 
du Comité des griefs. 
24.08.  Dans les dix (10) jours suivant la réunion du Comité de griefs, les Parties constatent s'il y 
a accord ou désaccord sur le grief. 
24.09.  S'il y a accord, il est constaté par une entente écrite entre le Syndicat et l'Université, et être 
signé par les représentants autorisés des Parties. Tout règlement doit faire l'objet d'une entente. 
24.10.  Si les parties en cause n'en arrivent pas à un règlement, le Syndicat ou l’Université peut 
recourir à la procédure d'arbitrage prévue en 24.11 de la présente convention. 
24.11 La demande d'arbitrage doit être communiquée au Vice-recteur aux ressources 
humaines dans les vingt-cinq (25) jours ouvrables qui suivent l'expiration du délai prévu en 
24.08. Lorsqu'un grief est soumis à l'arbitrage, le choix de l’arbitre se fera par tirage au sort parmi 
l’un des arbitres mentionnés subséquemment. Étant entendu que l’arbitre devra être en mesure de 
débuter l’audition dans les quatre-vingt-dix (90) jours suivants sa nomination par les Parties. 
- Alain Corriveau, Marc Gravel, André Rousseau, Carol Jobin, Diane Veilleux, Serge Brault 
Si aucun de ces arbitres ne peut agir, les Parties s’entendent sur le choix d’un autre arbitre. 
L'Université et le Syndicat peuvent, de consentement, nommer des assesseurs à l'arbitre. Dans ce 
cas, les dispositions du Code du travail à cet effet s'appliquent. 
Dans tous les cas, l'arbitre doit juger, conformément à la présente convention, qu'il ne peut 
modifier d'aucune façon. Lorsque l'avis de grief prévu au présent article comporte une 
réclamation pour le paiement d'une somme d'argent prévue aux présentes, le Syndicat pourra 
d'abord faire décider par l'arbitre saisi du grief, du droit à cette somme d'argent sans être tenu d'en 
établir le montant. S'il est décidé que le grief est bien fondé et si les Parties ne s'entendent pas sur 
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le montant à être payé, ce différend sera soumis pour décision au même arbitre, par simple avis 
écrit adressé à l'arbitre, et dans ce cas, les autres dispositions du présent article s'appliquent. 
L'arbitre peut maintenir, annuler ou mitiger toute mesure disciplinaire imposée par l'Université. Si 
le professeur a été congédié ou suspendu ou s'il y avait révocation, et si son grief est soumis à un 
arbitre nommé en vertu de la présente convention, cet arbitre peut: 
a) maintenir la sanction décrétée; 
b) réviser ou rejeter la sanction décrétée avec attribution, s'il y a lieu, d'une compensation 
partielle ou totale moins les autres gains que le professeur aurait pu accumuler ailleurs; 
c) constater toute décision jugée valable pour les deux (2) parties selon les circonstances. 
Si c'est l'Université qui décide de porter le grief à l'arbitrage, celle-ci en avise par écrit le 
Syndicat dans le même délai. Le Syndicat ou un professeur reconnaît expressément, pour les fins 
de l'article 24.05 de la convention collective, qu'il ne peut contredire un procès-verbal de la 
Commission des etudes par une preuve testimoniale obtenue par un professeur autorisé à assister 
comme observateur à une réunion de la Commission des études. Toute tentative dans le but 
d'introduire une telle preuve, par quelque moyen que ce soit, est expressément déclarée, aux fins 
d'un grief, strictement inadmissible et non recevable par un arbitre. 
24.12 L'arbitre doit, si possible, rendre sa décision dans les trente (30) jours qui suivent la 
date où la preuve est terminée. Cependant, l'arbitre peut s'adresser à l'Université et au 
Syndicat pour faire prolonger ce délai. Toutefois, la décision n'est pas nulle même si elle est 
rendue après l'expiration du délai prévu. 
24.13 La décision de l'arbitre unique est finale et sans appel. Elle doit être exécutée dans le 
plus bref délai possible ou avant l'expiration du délai prévu à la sentence, si tel est le cas. Si 
une Partie conteste la décision devant tout autre tribunal, la sentence s'applique quand même 
aussi longtemps que le dernier recours de l'une ou l'autre des Parties n'en aura pas decide 
autrement. 
24.14 Dans le cas de congédiement, le professeur qui a recours à la procédure de griefs peut 
exiger l'arbitrage sans en suivre les étapes préliminaires. 
24.15 Chaque Partie paie les frais de son assesseur. Les frais et honoraires de l'arbitre sont 
assumés conjointement par les deux Parties. Toutefois, ni l'une ni l'autre des Parties n'est tenue de 
payer des frais de transcription du compte rendu sténographique sans son consentement formel. 
24.16 L'Université libèrera avec traitement tout professeur appelé à témoigner à une séance 
d'arbitrage ou de comité de griefs. 
24.17 Une erreur technique dans la soumission écrite d'un grief n'en entraîne pas l'annulation. La 
rédaction d'un grief est faite à titre d'indication. La Partie qui soumet le grief, doit s'efforcer de 
bien exposer la matière dont il s'agit, mais la rédaction du grief de même que la mention des 
articles ou paragraphes de la convention s'y rapportant, peuvent être amendés. 
SPPUQTR - CONVENTION COLLECTIVE 2007-2012 (article 24) 
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